

Mill's reputation within a broad intellectual landscape and maps out many of the significant movements in moral and political philosophy during this century. For Skorupski, Mill's stature fell with the rise of European modernism and socialism for much of this century and began to rise in the last part of this century with their collapse. This perspective makes room for a broader cultural context within which Mill's ideas can resonate. One of the chief concerns of Skorupski's essay is to draw important contrasts between Mill's own philosophical naturalism and the resurgent naturalism of philosophers influenced by Quine; on the political level, this essay draws out interesting contrasts between the liberal ethos of Mill's philosophy and the more democratic ethos of perhaps the most significant liberal political theorist of this century, John Rawls. Many of the themes of Skorupski's insightful essay are taken up with care and at length in subsequent chapters. But what is perhaps most impressive about Skorupski's introduction is that it casts overly familiar interpretations of Mill into a new light. For political theorists with an interest in analytical theory, it can often seem as if there is nothing much new to be learned from Mill's passionate but often rather shaky defenses of liberty or utilitarianism. The essays in this collection can serve as the best possible antidote to that false perception. They provide not merely reviews of the best recent interpretations of debates and issues but novel engagements with those debates. Each essay is a significant contribution to Mill scholarship in its own right, but it is also a contribution to political theory and philosophy as well. What is also refreshing is that long-term scholars such as Ten and Ryan still have interesting and new angles with which to approach what should be all-too-familiar territory. There isn't a "dud" essay in the whole book, and that is no mean achievement in a collection of over six hundred pages.

The most rewarding essays for political theorists of a liberal persuasion are those of Robson, Terence Irwin, Ten, Ryan, and Skorupski. That is to offer no disrespect to the otherwise excellent essays by Donner on Mill's Utilitarianism and by Riley on Mill's political economy. Robson, Ryan, Ten, and Skorupski turn from the immediate technical details of Mill's arguments about the reconciliation of Utilitarianism and liberty, which have (perhaps inevitably) dominated the discussion of his liberalism. Instead they contribute to the recovery of the complex, subtle, occasionally brittle and priggish, but humane liberal ideal that Mill embodied and defended in a universe without a "beyond," an ideal which could shore up the case for liberal and humane values. In drawing these less formal but philosophically crucial insights from Mill's reflections on culture, the Greeks, democracy, and history, and through contrasting Mill's insights with those of subsequent liberalisms, these essays do much to challenge the aspirations of contemporary political liberalism. Whatever the merits of deriving "one very simple principle" from a version of act-Utilitarianism, Mill has profound and still suggestive things to say about culture, society, and human well-being. In the current climate in which liberalism makes minimal claims about the good life in order to achieve public consensus on the right, Mill's voice provides a significant challenge. The maintenance of liberal values must require more than a political liberalism for their long-term endorsement. However, the assertion of liberal values runs up against the egalitarian commitments of contemporary liberalism in its democratic Rawlsian guise. If one abandons the self-imposed restrictions of political liberalism, then one needs an account of the source and authority of liberal values. Mill's naturalistic philosophy provides an avenue of justification, but, as

Nietzsche's example shows, a return to philosophical naturalism does not have to result in liberalism. The dilemma of contemporary liberalism is to respond creatively to the insights of both Mill and Nietzsche.

Mill's liberal reputation is often obscured by superficial readings of his essays *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism*; a careful perusal of the essays collected in this fine volume will provide a challenge to that tendency. Mill may not be the only guide necessary for liberals in the twenty-first century, but he remains an essential one from which we can still learn much.

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Voet, Rian. *Feminism and Citizenship*.

London: Sage Publications, 1998. Pp. xi+182. \$22.95 (paper).

During the past three decades popular and academic political discourses have witnessed a revival of debate about citizenship and a revitalized interest in feminism. Only recently, however, have discussions about citizenship and feminism begun to be explicitly connected. Rian Voet's work, *Feminism and Citizenship*, is a noteworthy contribution to this new trend and perhaps the only book systematically to articulate and evaluate contemporary feminist views on citizenship. By engaging in a critical dialogue with the dominant liberal conception of citizenship and the main feminist alternatives, Voet develops a promising "sex-equal and active" citizenship theory.

The first part of the book presents useful preliminary information about feminism, liberalism, and the dominant modern citizenship theories. The second part is devoted to Voet's explorations of the social liberal (which I would call welfare-state liberal) and second-wave feminist approaches to six subthemes of citizenship: liberty, rights, social equality, political subjectivity, political representation, and political judgment. Although limited space prohibits the detailed discussion that Voet's exhaustive analysis deserves, I will briefly discuss one theme that figures prominently throughout the book. Voet contends that by focusing too narrowly on issues arising in the equality-difference debate in feminism, second-wave feminists have overlooked a more important problem with social liberalism: its passive conception of citizenship. For instance, the feminist debate on rights has focused almost exclusively on the question of whether feminists should pursue equal or special rights for women. On the one hand, humanist feminists, who endorse a gender-neutral citizenship, have criticized social liberalism for failing to apply so-called universal rights, civil and social rights in particular, to women. On the other hand, woman-centered feminists, who envision a gender-differentiated citizenship, and deconstructionist feminists, who generally attempt to dismantle dichotomies such as equality and difference, have attacked social liberals for refusing to allow special rights for specially situated groups of people. Rarely criticized by any feminists, Voet claims, is the erroneous social liberal assumption that possessing formal rights is sufficient for full citizenship. Western women have equal formal rights, and "enough possibilities exist to claim some special rights" (p. 72), yet women are not full citizens in terms of

their participation in the higher levels of the public sphere and in political decision making. Voet concludes that a passive conception of citizenship based on legal status is unable to recognize, much less correct, the tremendously unequal social and political participation of women and men. Feminists, therefore, must reject a strictly passive conception of citizenship in favor of an active citizenship that takes the level of public participation, not the possession of formal rights, as an indicator of full citizenship. A theory of active citizenship will include rights, liberty, and a certain level of material equality as preconditions of full citizenship, but it will give a greater emphasis to the activities, obligations, and virtues connected with full citizenship.

Voet contends that neither social liberal citizenship nor any of the feminist alternatives is able to offer a sex-equal and active citizenship—in the sense of encouraging women to become equally active in public decision-making bodies. Thus, in the third part of the book, she attempts to develop a feminist participatory conception of citizenship. Voet's theory, which embodies aspects of social liberalism and civic republicanism, includes four elements: active citizenship, sex-equal citizenship, a necessary rotation of elites, and woman-friendly citizenship. The latter consists of proposals for making citizenship activities more accessible and appealing to women (e.g., designing political positions so that active citizens have time to spend with their loved ones and providing feminist political actors with the means to develop woman-friendly policies). Voet's conception of active citizenship draws upon Aristotle's distinction between the citizen and the good citizen: the citizen, Voet explains, is someone who has a right to participate in public affairs; the full or active (or "good") citizen is someone who actually exercises his or her right to participate in public decision making. Voet expands Aristotle's conception of public affairs to include "all decision-making bodies in which the content of the existing or future society is determined . . . through cooperat[ion] among people" (p. 137). This includes not only democratic political institutions, but also nondemocratic and social decision making bodies such as "socio-economic boards, the top echelons of the military and police, ministries, university councils and senates, unions, and the boards of media organizations" (p. 137). Voet considers public decision making to be the most desirable form of citizenship activity; however, she suggests that social participation in the form of paid employment is also important to citizenship. Paid work leads to material welfare, independence, respect, power, social status, and influence. Even more important, paid employment may prepare citizens for participation in public decision making by familiarizing them with the skills and virtues necessary for active citizenship.

Voet's theory of sex-equal and active citizenship improves upon traditional participatory citizenship theories by expanding the concept of public participation to include participation in informal politics and social decision making bodies, arenas in which women, particularly working-class women and women of color, are already more likely to be involved than formal politics. The work as a whole, however, is not without weaknesses. A preliminary concern is that Voet seems to characterize her position as a solution to deficiencies plaguing the schools of feminist thought that she criticizes. However, this may not be sufficiently charitable to those theories. For instance, Voet complains that second-wave feminists have not adequately criticized the social liberal suggestion that "rights are the centre of citizenship and that possessing the same rights as others

is enough to make someone a full citizen" (p. 73). But this complaint fails to give due credit to the many feminists—humanist, woman-centered, and deconstructionist feminists included—who have already taken liberalism to task on these grounds.

Moreover, there are two substantive problems with Voet's suggestion that paid employment is the primary site in which citizens learn the virtues and skills of active citizenship. First, Voet overlooks the possibility that citizens may be able to become familiar with the virtues and skills required for responsible citizenship by participating in the voluntary organizations of civil society including the family. One can imagine that men and women could learn certain citizenship skills such as "bearing responsibility, thinking about the common good, and acting together with other citizens in a common task" (p. 139) by engaging in a number of unpaid endeavors, from various caring practices to involvement in local cooperatives. This suggestion need not involve uncritically endorsing the values of the domestic sphere as an inspiration for politics, a move Voet rightly rejects. Second, Voet fails to consider that, like the civil society, the market promotes numerous values, some of which may be essential for good citizenship and others that may be counterproductive to it. Some workplace "virtues" may be necessary for good citizenship, such as responsibility and persuasiveness; others, however, such as servility and greed, may be inimical to it. More work must be done before Voet's theory of citizenship is able to answer one of the most difficult questions facing participatory citizenship theorists: where do we learn the skills and virtues necessary for good citizenship?

In closing, Voet's book makes a significant contribution to the burgeoning debate on feminism and citizenship. *Feminism and Citizenship* provides a comprehensive and often insightful analysis of social liberal and feminist views on citizenship and offers a promising initial attempt at a feminist participatory conception of citizenship. Indeed, every citizen would benefit from reading Voet's book and from "trying to imagine how our world might look if we took [her sex-equal and active citizenship theory] as our ideal" (p. 147).

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Warren, Mary Anne. *Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. 265. \$37.50 (cloth).

Mary Anne Warren focuses on the moral status of entities, from human beings and nonhuman animals to species and ecosystems. In the first part of her book, devoted to a theory of moral status, Warren devotes a chapter to the concept of moral status and five chapters to different theories about what constitutes moral status. Four of these accounts are uni-criterial: all living beings have equal moral status; all sentient beings have equal moral status; all persons have equal moral status; and moral status is a function of relationships (social and/or ecological). Each of these uni-criterial views has variants which allow for additional features. Warren rejects each uni-criterial view and concludes with a multi-criterial view that incorporates each of them and more. In the second part