

## BOOK REVIEWS

de-Shalit, Avner. *Cities and Immigration: Political and Moral Dilemmas in the New Era of Migration*.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. 192. \$80.00 (cloth).

Whereas philosophers of migration tend to focus on the abstract question of whether liberal states have a moral right to regulate their borders, this exciting new book addresses immigration in the context in which it is most often experienced: the city. Several considerations support de-Shalit's decision to focus on immigration to cities. First, and most obviously, "contemporary immigration is fundamentally urban" (6). Most immigrants settle in metropolitan areas, and popular destination cities have become home to large immigrant populations. As a result, de-Shalit argues, cities must navigate the twofold challenge of immigrant integration. Both newcomers and established residents—"city-zens," as de-Shalit calls them—need a strong sense of place in order to flourish; identifying with and feeling included in one's local community is essential to one's well-being. However, immigrants too often face exploitation, material deprivation, social segregation, or political exclusion in destination communities. Immigration also causes anxiety for city-zens, who may experience it as a threat to their sense of place. City-zens tend to identify strongly with the particular ethos that defines their city and makes it unique. Immigration can challenge the coherence of this ethos, leading them to feel estranged from their own city. Given this empirical context, metropolitan cities have strong reasons for wanting to adopt autonomous immigration policies. For instance, in countries that restrict immigration, declining cities may see increased immigration as a way to compensate for population losses. Cities also may wish to attract new immigrants who have special skills that the city needs. In countries with permissive immigration policies, city-zens of popular destination cities may want to limit immigration to their location or to selectively admit immigrants in order to preserve their particular urban ethos.

*Cities and Immigration* addresses three normative questions: Should cities have autonomous immigration policies? Should cities grant local political rights to immigrants before they become citizens of the state? How should immigrants be integrated into the city? Two features of the book will be familiar to readers of de-Shalit's earlier work. The first is his methodological approach. As a committed urban political theorist, he insists that discussions about the city should "begin with strolling and talking to urbanites" (25). Thus, many of the arguments in this book are derived from interviews he conducted with residents of several popular immigrant destination cities: Amsterdam, Berlin, Jerusalem, London, New York, San Francisco, and Thessaloniki, Greece. de-Shalit also draws on empirical studies and the philosophical literature on immigration to flesh out and evaluate these arguments.

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Some chapters punctuate this relatively straightforward, academic pose with anecdotes and personal reflections from his urban rambles.

The second familiar feature of the book is de-Shalit's commitment to urban communitarianism. He understands the city as a distinctive moral community, characterized by a unique ethos, spirit, or story. Like national narratives, an urban ethos defines the identity of the city, distinguishing it from other localities. Yet whereas national narratives tend to center on notions of history, tradition, and ethnicity, urban ethos are "place oriented and place derived" (104). People experience the city through its design, architecture, and public spaces, as well as the things that happen there, such as art festivals, exhibitions, local politics, and personal relationships among residents. A city's ethos conveys its unique character, along with understandings about how residents should live together and relate to their local institutions and environment. It is a vital source of identity and group membership for inhabitants, enabling them to develop and sustain a strong sense of place. Thus, city leaders should strive to protect and promote their distinctive urban ethos when they design local policies, including those concerning immigration.

Chapter 1 focuses on the first central question of the book: should cities have autonomous immigration policies—or, more specifically, should cities be permitted to limit immigration, open their borders, or adopt selective admissions policies? de-Shalit dismisses the first two possibilities fairly quickly. The arguments for local immigration restrictions are implausible, and although the idea of open urban borders aligns with his own intuitions, "it is quite difficult to either support or dismiss the idea with a consistent and coherent philosophical argument" (27). He offers more definitive answers with respect to selective admissions policies. de-Shalit considers two types: selective refusal policies, whereby the city selectively prohibits entrance to some group of prospective immigrants, and selective encouragement policies, whereby the city selectively encourages entrance for some group, giving members priority without denying entrance to anyone. He argues that selective refusal policies are permissible only to prevent the settlement of convicted criminals or political criminals, such as racists or neo-Nazis. Such exclusions are justified, in his view, because these groups threaten the ability of the city to fulfill its basic obligations to residents, namely, protecting their lives, bodily integrity, and freedom. Other criteria for exclusion are ruled out because they discriminate arbitrarily on the basis of brute luck, excluding "those who happen to lack the skills which are needed in a particular city or who happen to hold different sets of beliefs" through no choice of their own (49). Selective encouragement policies, on the other hand, are morally permissible if they target groups of prospective immigrants who can provide needed services to current residents or who are likely to be integrated easily into the destination city because they are ready to adopt its ethos. The latter criterion is justified because the presence of a well-integrated immigrant community will facilitate the successful integration of future immigrants to the city.

Chapter 2 addresses the second guiding question of the book: should cities grant political rights, specifically the rights to vote and run for political office, to immigrants before they become citizens of the state? Theorists who endorse local voting for immigrants typically invoke one of the following principles: (a) the principle of fair play, which implies that immigrants deserve the right to vote in exchange for their contributions to the city; (b) the all affected principle, which

maintains that everyone, including immigrants, who will be affected by a municipal policy is entitled to participate in electing the governing body that will design this legislation; or (c) the principle of nondomination, which suggests that extending suffrage to immigrants is needed to counter the threat of arbitrary rule. Although de-Shalit acknowledges that these arguments have merit, he believes they share a common shortcoming: they regard immigrants *qua* individuals, rather than as members of the local community. In his view, members of the city “should have a say in its direction and future” because they share “the same fate, vision, even mission” (99). Immigrants become members of the city by taking part in everyday urban activities—going to work, taking public transportation, dropping off their children at school, stopping by the market, and so on—and by developing personal relationships with other residents. In doing so, they develop a strong interest in the future of the city and its flourishing. Granting voting rights to immigrants also has important symbolic value, as political participation encourages newcomers to feel like they belong in the city and enhances their sense of place. Thus, de-Shalit concludes, the city should grant the right to vote in local elections to immigrants, after an agreed-upon period of time, provided that they declare their intent to make the city their home. Immigrants who have satisfied an additional residency requirement, mastered the local language, and become familiar with the city’s ethos should also be allowed to run for local office.

Chapter 3 focuses on the book’s third core question: how should immigrants be integrated into the city? To address this question, de-Shalit explores the three models of inclusion adopted by three popular immigration destination cities: Jerusalem, Berlin, and Amsterdam. He begins by unpacking the challenge of immigrant integration that motivates his project. Immigration often generates three levels of pluralism: sociological, axiological, and psychological. Sociological pluralism involves relatively superficial differences in language, style of dress, food, and manners. Axiological pluralism refers to diversity in ethical, religious, or political values. Finally, psychological pluralism is about identity; it involves the various ways in which individuals, both city-zens and newcomers, respond to difference. Whereas some people tolerate cultural differences but do not change themselves according to new values and practices, other people embrace and willingly assimilate new values, norms, practices, and languages into their self-conceptions. The cities de-Shalit studies can be understood in terms of which level or levels of pluralism they accommodate and how they go about doing so. Jerusalem accommodates sociological pluralism through segregation, achieving a fragile coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis. Berlin’s model of tolerance from indifference addresses both sociological and axiological pluralism. Immigrants are welcomed, but Berliners have largely adopted a Lockean attitude of toleration, according to which different values and identities are accepted as long as they are not imposed on others. Finally, Amsterdam’s model of mutual assimilation accommodates all three levels of pluralism. Motivated by genuine curiosity, both immigrants and city-zens are eager to learn about each other, and ultimately to internalize parts of the other’s values and practices into their own identities. de-Shalit clearly favors Amsterdam’s integration model, but he concludes that none is morally superior; different models will suit different cities based on their particular histories and social, demographic, spatial, and political circumstances. However, he does draw one policy

recommendation from his study: since a kind of fit between the ethos, economy, and other features of the city of origin and those of the city of destination is a key factor of successful immigrant integration, immigrants would be well-advised to settle in like-minded cities.

*Cities and Immigration* is an innovative and refreshing antidote to the abstract arguments typically advanced in the philosophical literature on immigration. de-Shalit draws a number of intriguing insights from his extensive interviews with city dwellers, vivid examples of city life, and his own impressions of the cities he visited. In doing so, he makes a compelling case that the normative questions he identifies deserve sustained philosophical attention. However, some of his answers to these questions may not satisfy every reader. Take, for instance, his response to the first central question of the book: whether cities should have autonomous immigration policies. Since it is widely agreed that states, not cities, have the moral authority to regulate immigration (assuming, of course, that any political community has this authority), answering this question affirmatively would require establishing that cities rather than states should have this power. However, de-Shalit moves directly to a different question, namely, how cities should exercise their authority to regulate immigration—that is, should they limit immigration, open their borders, or adopt selective admissions policies? This discussion is quite interesting, but it presupposes the controversial claim that cities should have the moral authority to regulate immigration in the first place. de-Shalit understands the city as a distinctive kind of political community, different from the nation or state in morally salient respects. Thus, one might expect him to identify a plausible justification for the moral authority to regulate immigration and argue that cities rather than states possess this authority. For instance, some theorists argue that the right to regulate immigration is an essential component of the right to collective self-determination. They typically identify the nation or people as the appropriate agent of self-determination, but de-Shalit could argue that the city is a more fitting agent. If this argument were plausible, he could justifiably conclude that cities, not states, have the authority to regulate immigration and proceed to consider the particular immigration policies cities should adopt. Of course, de-Shalit may not endorse the self-determination argument. However, in absence of some justification for the city's authority to regulate immigration, readers on both sides of the open borders debate will likely be unconvinced by the discussion. It should be noted that de-Shalit ultimately recommends adopting a "multi-level attitude" toward immigration, in which the city has *prima facie* authority to regulate immigration but is expected to consult with the state about ways in which to alleviate concerns about their policies (54). However, he does not provide an argument for why cities rather than states should possess this presumptive authority.

Readers may also take issue with the ways in which arguments from the philosophical literature are deployed in the book. de-Shalit draws liberally from arguments advanced in the open borders debate to evaluate the views expressed by his interviewees. This is an interesting move since these arguments address similar questions, only at the national level. However, de-Shalit sometimes relies too heavily on this literature. Most of the arguments he hastily rejects will be familiar to readers who are acquainted with the open borders debate, and some of his positive arguments presuppose key moral claims from this debate. For instance, his

argument that only those selective refusal policies that exclude convicted and political criminals are morally permissible rests on the core moral premise of luck egalitarianism. de-Shalit contends that any other grounds for exclusion would be impermissible because, as we have seen, they would disadvantage people based on brute luck. However, since de-Shalit does not defend the idea that it is wrong to disadvantage people based on characteristics over which they have no control, readers who do not already endorse luck egalitarianism may be unconvinced by this argument.

The book also misses some key opportunities to engage with the philosophical literature. For instance, the appendix to chapter 1 (coauthored by Despoina Glarou) provides a fascinating study of the factors that motivated the residents of Thessaloniki to welcome Syrian refugees in 2015, despite the city's high unemployment rate and fragile economy. Residents claim that they were guided by Thessaloniki's ethos of *philoxenia*, or love for the stranger. After elucidating the local understanding of *philoxenia*, de-Shalit and Glarou conclude that although it is certainly a desirable moral virtue, *philoxenia* cannot be transformed into a political principle and exported to other cities for two reasons: moral virtues generally do not translate well into institutional principles, and Thessaloniki's ethos is shaped by its unique history and distinctive spatial features. Interestingly, the authors contrast *philoxenia* with our ordinary conception of hospitality, understood as "entertaining friends in your home," but they do not explore its connection to the philosophical notion of hospitality developed by Kant, Derrida, and many others. The latter notion construes hospitality as a universal moral obligation to welcome the stranger unconditionally. Comparing *philoxenia* to this sense of hospitality would generally be quite interesting, and especially so given that the idea that hospitality is a universal obligation poses a challenge to de-Shalit and Glarou's claim that *philoxenia* is a contextual moral virtue, provided, as it seems, that the content of these notions is similar.

These concerns suggest that the central arguments of *Cities and Immigration* may not satisfy everyone. However, this should not dissuade readers from engaging with this thought-provoking book. By developing an empirically informed approach to theorizing immigration to cities, de-Shalit has enhanced our understanding of the moral considerations at play in immigration policy decisions and made a significant contribution to the philosophical literature on migration.

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Halliday, Daniel. *The Inheritance of Wealth: Justice, Equality, and the Right to Bequeath*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 256. \$42.95 (cloth).

The lack of direct attention that has been paid by political philosophers to the moral issue posed by inherited or bequeathed wealth is somewhat striking. While economists and political scientists have written books over the past forty years or so squarely addressing inheritance, I am aware of only one sustained examination of the subject by a philosopher: D. W. Haslett's *Capitalism with Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). In his excellently argued and highly original new book, *The Inheritance of Wealth*, Daniel Halliday effectively fills that gap.