Toward a Nonideal Approach to Immigration Justice
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Abstract

Critics of so-called "ideal theory" argue that prevailing liberal egalitarian principles are constructed under idealized assumptions and are thus ill suited to real-world circumstances where such assumptions do not apply. Specifically, they raise three related objections: (1) ideal theory cannot help us understand current injustices in the actual, nonideal world; (2) ideal principles are not sufficiently action-guiding; and (3) ideal theory tends to reflect and perpetuate unjust group privilege. This chapter explores recent philosophical work on immigration in light of these criticisms. I argue that prominent arguments on both sides of the open borders debate are subject to the standard criticisms of ideal theory, and thus that a nonideal approach to migration justice is urgently needed. I suggest several methodological desiderata for such an approach.

I. Introduction

Recently, political philosophers have begun to interrogate the methodology they use to construct normative principles. Some have voiced the concern that prevailing liberal egalitarian principles are constructed under idealized assumptions and thus are ill suited to real-world circumstances where such assumptions do not apply. Specifically, critics have raised three related objections to so-called "ideal theory": (1) ideal theory cannot help us understand current injustices in the actual, nonideal world; (2) ideal principles are not sufficiently action-guiding; and (3) ideal theory is counterproductive—or even dangerous—because it tends to reflect and perpetuate unjust group privilege.[1]

This chapter explores recent work on the ethics of immigration in light of these methodological criticisms, focusing on the open borders debate. The central question in this debate is whether liberal states may justifiably restrict immigration. I argue that prominent arguments on both sides of this issue are subject to the standard criticisms of ideal theory, and thus that a nonideal approach to immigration justice is urgently needed. My argument proceeds as follows: I begin by briefly

outlining the defining features of ideal theory and the main objections to it, then I argue that the central arguments in the open borders debate are vulnerable to these criticisms, and finally, I suggest several methodological desiderata for a nonideal approach to migration justice.

II. Ideal Theory

What is Ideal Theory?

Perhaps the easiest way to explain the nature of ideal theory is to contrast it with nonideal theory. This distinction has been drawn in several ways; I will focus on two of the most common strategies. The first way of specifying the distinction focuses on the type of normative prescriptions the theory aims to produce.[2] Both ideal and nonideal theories of justice develop normative frameworks that enable us to make principled moral judgments about social institutions. However, they differ with respect to the nature and scope of the normative prescriptions they enable. Ideal theory focuses on perfect justice: it aims to design principles that would apply to fully just social arrangements. Rawls's theory of justice is often considered to be the paradigmatic example of this approach.[3] Nonideal theory, in contrast, focuses on justice improvements: it aims to identify how the world could be more just without necessarily determining what the ideally just society would look like. Feminist political philosophy, which seeks to end the subordination of women without necessarily developing a complete theory of justice, is an example of this theoretical approach.[4]

The second way to draw the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory pertains to the type of assumptions that the theory incorporates.[5] All theories of justice include assumptions about human capacities, social ontologies, and social institutions. However, ideal and nonideal theories differ with respect to the nature of the assumptions they admit. Namely, ideal theory includes idealized assumptions, whereas nonideal theory explicitly rejects such idealizations. Characterizations of idealization often draw upon Onora O'Neill's distinction between idealization and abstraction. Both forms of theorizing involve simplifying a given problem by bracketing off—or abstracting away from—some of its complexities. However, whereas abstraction merely simplifies a given phenomenon, idealization also attributes desirable features to the phenomenon that it actually does not possess. That is, as O'Neill explains, idealization involves assumptions that represent the world as simpler *and* better than it actually is, whereas abstraction rejects the latter move.[6]

Charles Mills explains the contrast between ideal and nonideal theory by distinguishing between descriptive and idealizing models.[7] Descriptive models, which he associates with nonideal theory,

provide a schematic representation of a given phenomenon as it actually exists. As such, these models simplify the phenomenon, including only those features that are most important to it. Descriptive models select features based on whether they accurately capture what the phenomenon being modeled is actually like, not on how desirable these features are. Idealized models, in contrast, represent the ideal nature of a phenomenon; they represent what the phenomenon *should* be like. Consequently, these models select features on the basis of their desirability, often attributing characteristics to a phenomenon that deviate significantly from those occurring in the actual world.

Philosophers concerned with this version of the ideal/nonideal theory distinction typically identify three particular types of idealizations as characteristic of ideal theory. The first pertains to the feasibility constraints that a theory takes into account. Ideal theories tend to consider few, if any, feasibility constraints in the design of normative principles, whereas nonideal theories take into account some of the real-world factual constraints that arise within unfavorable social, historical, or economic conditions. The second type of idealization concerns the degree of compliance assumed on the theory. Ideal theories are constructed under the assumption that agents will fully comply with the demands of justice. Nonideal theory, by contrast, begins with the assumption that agents will sometimes fail to act on their moral duties and develops principles for guiding our responses in such cases of noncompliance. Finally, the third type of idealization refers to a constellation of assumptions about human agents and the social world we inhabit. Specifically, ideal theory tends to presuppose, while nonideal theory attempts to avoid, the following: (a) an idealized social ontology populated by abstract, atomistic, and independent individuals; (b) an idealized account of human capacities that represents agents as significantly more rational, self-aware, or independent than they actually are; and (c) an idealized model of fundamental social institutions, such as the family, the legal system, or the economy.

Three Objections to Ideal Theory

Now that we have an understanding of the central features of ideal theory, I will briefly discuss three objections that are commonly raised against this methodological approach. The first objection charges that ideal theory is unable to theorize actual, existing injustices.[8] Mills frames this objection in terms of the inevitable gap between idealized models and the actual phenomena they represent.[9] This gap is a matter of concern because ideal theorists tend to assume that one can draw exclusively or primarily on ideal models in order to gain an understanding of an actual phenomenon. However,

in cases in which the actual phenomenon is quite different from the ideal, ideal models are of little help in understanding the actual phenomenon. Ideal theories of justice tend to abstract away from undesirable features of the actual social world, such as relations of domination and oppression, and represent human agents as not having been affected by a history of injustice or by its ongoing effects. Consequently, because the resulting theories differ from the actual world in crucial respects, they are unable to help us understand the real-world injustices that characterize it.

Of course, proponents of ideal theory argue that ideal theories play an essential role in theorizing injustice—namely, they provide normative standards by which to evaluate actual social relations and institutions.[10] In other words, they insist that we can determine the moral status of existing social arrangements by comparing them to the perfectly just arrangements that ideal theories recommend. However, critics of ideal theory reject this rejoinder.[11] In their view, although ideal theories may indeed enable us to establish that a given social institution deviates from the ideal, this alone tells us little about the nature of the unjust institution. To use Mills's example, simply showing that white supremacy deviates from the ideal of racial justice does little to illuminate the nature of white supremacy.

A second and related criticism maintains that ideal theory fails to be action-guiding.[12] Most philosophers agree that any plausible theory of justice must offer normative guidance concerning how we ought to act—that is, it should help us "get things done." However, some critics of ideal theory insist that ideal principles fail to satisfy this criterion because they cannot tell us how to respond to conditions of actual injustice. Ideal principles may be action-guiding under ideal circumstances, such as when all agents fulfill their moral duties, but unless we are in such circumstances, they tell us little about how to act. Moreover, even if we assume, along with proponents of ideal theory, that ideal principles are useful in that they provide normative standards by which to evaluate actual social relations, ideal theory still could not tell us how to transition from existing unjust relations to ideally just arrangements. For instance, suppose we agree that a particular ideal of racial justice is justified—say, for the sake of argument, a "color-blind" society (although, of course, most progressives would reject this notion)—this ideal itself provides little guidance about how to bridge the gap between our present white supremacist reality and more egalitarian social relations.

Finally, some critics go beyond these objections to argue that ideal theory is counterproductive and even potentially dangerous.[13] Mills contends that ideal theory is counterproductive because efforts to design a fully just social order obscure unjust power relations, such as those based on gender and race. Even more troubling, he argues, ideal theory tends to be ideological and therefore potentially dangerous. It is often assumed that idealized assumptions about enhanced human capacities are essentially objective, even if they are false or unrealistic. However, Mills argues that idealizations tend to reflect the interests and experiences of the theorists who make use of them. It follows, he argues, that although ideal theory purports to identify objective principles of justice, it actually reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of the middle-to-upper-class white men who produce it. Thus, ideal theory is, in crucial respects, not only obfuscatory, but also "ideological, in the pejorative sense of a set of group ideas that reflect, and contribute to perpetuating, illicit group privilege."[14]

Given these objections, critics argue that ideal theory is of little use to actual oppressed subjects struggling against injustice, and they urge philosophers to develop nonideal approaches capable of theorizing real-world injustice and guiding our responses to it. How such theories ought to be structured and what particular methodologies they should employ are open questions to which I will return. First, however, I will argue that prominent arguments in the open borders debate are subject to the standard criticisms of ideal theory.

III. The Open Borders Debate and Ideal Theory

The central question in the open borders debate is whether liberal states may justifiably restrict immigration. On one side of the debate, philosophers argue that liberal states have broad discretion over immigration policy.[15] States will typically admit immigrants whose talents, assets, or skills are perceived to be in the national interest, but they are morally free to restrict immigration as they see fit, with few exceptions. On the other side of the controversy, commentators argue that immigration restrictions are inconsistent with basic liberal egalitarian ideals, such as freedom, equality and democracy.[16] It follows, they conclude, that liberal states should maintain open borders, welcoming (nearly) all prospective immigrants who seek admission.

The Freedom of Movement Argument

The freedom of movement argument, developed by Joseph Carens, is the perhaps best-known argument for the open borders position.[17] Put simply, the argument maintains that individuals have a basic, human right to freedom of international movement that states must respect by maintaining open borders. Recent versions of the argument feature an analogy between free internal movement and free international movement.[18] Liberals widely agree that the right to move freely between states within a nation-state is a basic right of citizenship. This right, according to Carens, is grounded in the liberal commitment to individual autonomy: free internal movement is considered to be a right because it is essential to citizens' ability to pursue their life plans. Carens argues that the ability to move between nation-states is often equally essential to the exercise of autonomy as is free internal movement. In fact, every reason that a person might have for moving to a new state within a nation-state could also apply to moving across national borders. In his words:

> One might want a job; one might fall in love with someone from another country; one might belong to a religion that has few adherents in one's native state and many in another; one may wish to pursue cultural opportunities that are only available in another land.[19]

Since the same fundamental human interests that support the case for considering free internal movement to be a basic right also support the case for considering free international movement to be a basic right, Carens concludes that freedom of international movement is a fundamental human right. He believes that the right to free international movement establishes a strong presumption for open borders. Nevertheless, Carens acknowledges that limitations on immigration can sometimes be justified if they are supported by compelling reasons that are themselves compatible with liberal commitments. For instance, states may legitimately restrict immigration as is necessary to maintain public order, safeguard national security, or protect liberal institutions from erosion by illiberal values.

The Freedom of Association Argument

The freedom of association argument, developed by Kit Wellman, is one of the most prominent arguments for the closed borders position.[20] It maintains that the liberal right to freedom of association gives states a right to regulate immigration, excluding prospective immigrants, including refugees, at their discretion. The argument proceeds in two stages. The first seeks to establish that states have a broad right to freedom of association, which includes a presumptive right to exclude

prospective immigrants. The second aims to show that this presumptive right is not outweighed by standard egalitarian considerations, and thus that states may legitimately close their borders in practice.

Wellman begins with the relatively uncontroversial claim that both individuals and states have a right to self-determination, which includes a right to freedom of association. Using the examples of marriage and religion, Wellman argues that the individual right to free association gives people authority over whom they choose to associate with, and, importantly for the purposes of his argument, also whom they choose *not* to associate with. Wellman then argues by way of analogy that just as the individual right to free association gives people the right to decide for themselves whom they will marry, or to forgo marriage altogether, the collective right to free association give states the right to decide which immigrants they will admit, or to exclude immigrants altogether. Wellman is quick to point out that the state's right to exclude is a presumptive right: it can be outweighed by competing moral claims. Specifically, he acknowledges that states have stringent Samaritan and relational egalitarian duties to outsiders. However, he insists that these duties do not require states to open their borders in practice because they can be satisfied by "exporting justice" in the form of material aid or military intervention. Thus, Wellman concludes, states have an all things considered right to close borders at their discretion.

These Arguments as Ideal Theory

My earlier discussion of the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory suggests that ideal theory has two characteristic features: (a) it aims to develop normative principles that would secure fully just social arrangements; in other words, it designs ideal principles of justice; and (b) it constructs these principles under idealized assumptions about human capacities and the social world. I will now argue that both the freedom of movement and the freedom of association arguments share these defining features. On the face of it, it appears that both arguments possess the first characteristic of ideal theory: Carens contends that states would maintain open borders in a fully just world, and Wellman argues that states would be free to close borders at their discretion in such a world.[21] However, it is important to note that both theorists acknowledge that exceptions to their preferred immigration arrangements could be justified under certain real-world circumstances. Carens allows that limited immigration restrictions would be justified if they were required to protect important public goods, and Wellman concedes that the right to close borders must be balanced

against duties to outsiders (although he insists these duties do not require states to admit immigrants in practice). These concessions may seem to suggest that contrary to initial appearances, the freedom of movement and the freedom of association arguments actually do not aim to develop ideal principles of justice. However, this assumption rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of ideal principles. Although both arguments develop presumptive principles—that is, prima facie principles that could be outweighed by strong competing claims under certain circumstances—this fact does not establish that these principles are not ideal in the relevant sense. The defining feature of ideal theory is not that it develops *absolute* principles in the sense that these principles can never be overridden by competing moral claims, but rather that it designs *ideal* principles in the sense that these principles would secure fully just social arrangements ceteris paribus. To put the point another way, both Carens and Wellman consider the identification of fully just immigration arrangements to be the primary aim of their arguments. They see real-world considerations as generating possible exceptions to these ideal arrangements, not as the starting point for normative analysis.

The freedom of movement and the freedom of association arguments also presuppose a number of idealized assumptions about human capacities and the social world. I will outline several, beginning with the freedom of movement argument. Most obviously, the analogy between internal and international movement misrepresents migrants as abstract, independent agents who simply choose to move to a new country based on the opportunities that are available there. This overstates the degree of independence and information possessed by many migrants. In actuality, most people must base their migration decisions on limited and contradictory information about receiving countries. Moreover, many migrants act not as independent agents seeking to maximize the opportunities available to them, but rather as members of a family, household, or even a community that has decided that the migration of some members is in its collective best interest. In such cases, the social group is the basic decision-making unit with respect to migration, not the individual agent.

The argument also rests on an idealized notion of the causes of migration. The decisions of individual agents—whether they are individual persons or collective social units—are certainly one contributing factor in migration processes. However, broader social, economic, and political policies and institutions also play a critical role in shaping migration, both enabling and constraining the options available to migrants as well as their freedom to exercise these options. Private industries actively recruit foreign workers for reasons that are inherent in the structure of advanced economies,

primarily to fill unskilled, poorly paid, and unstable jobs that native workers do not want. The expansion of global capital into less developed regions tends to create vulnerable populations prone to migration, and neoliberal economic policies have exacerbated wealth disparities between the Global North and Global South, stimulating migration from developing to developed countries. Trade liberalization agreements and imperialist foreign policies also contribute to influxes of economic and political migration. And the so-called migration industry, made up of lawyers, recruitment agencies, smugglers, NGOs, entrepreneurial agents, etc., also plays an important role in determining what options are available to prospective migrants.

Finally, the freedom of movement argument also presupposes idealizations about the opportunities and obstacles associated with migration. Carens portrays the opportunities that purportedly await immigrants in receiving countries as abstract, universally accessible options, simply waiting to be exercised, much like classical economists portray products for sale in a free market. In actuality, however, many so-called migration "pull factors" are actively created and manipulated by, and for the benefit of, private industries and state governments. The implied suggestion that borders are the only obstacles to free movement also tends to obscure the real-world social, political, economic forces that shape migration processes, including those background injustices that generate migration or create obstacles to movement for many prospective migrants. It also represents borders as static artifacts rather than as active practices in which power is generated and deployed.

Wellman also constructs his freedom of association argument under idealized assumptions. Two are particularly prominent. First, the analogy between the individual and the collective right to freedom of association rests on an idealized notion of political community. Specifically, the suggestion that the decision to exclude migrants is analogous to the decision to reject potential suitors implies that political communities, like individuals, are unified entities, speaking in a single voice. However, this vastly overstates the degree of agreement about membership decisions in actual political communities. Of course, a person may be torn about whether she should marry a given suitor, but this inner turmoil does not approximate the deep, enduring divisions that characterize national debates on immigration.

The freedom of association argument also rests on a highly idealized portrayal of military intervention and the provision of aid. As we know, Wellman acknowledges that states have weighty

Samaritan and egalitarian duties to outsiders, but he insists that these obligations do not require states to open their borders because they can be discharged by exporting material aid or through military intervention rather than by admitting immigrants. That this claim relies on highly idealized assumptions about the nature and efficacy of military intervention should go without saying. We are all acutely aware of the many ways in which military interventions often go horribly wrong. The provision of material aid is also more complicated than Wellman portrays it, as aid sometimes fails to reach the people who need it most, and affluent states too often use the promise of aid to gain leverage over developing countries in policy negotiations.

Three Criticisms of Ideal Approaches to Immigration

I have argued that that the freedom of movement and freedom of association arguments share two characteristic features of ideal theory. I will now argue that these arguments are also subject to the standard objections raised against it. First, the freedom of movement and freedom of association arguments are unable to theorize many of the injustices associated with real-world migration. As I have suggested, the arguments presuppose idealized notions of migrants and their agency, the circumstances in which migration occurs, and the social and political institutions associated with it. In doing so, they represent these phenomena as simpler and better than they actually are, while abstracting away from the background conditions that shape real-world migration. Because real-world migration is actually quite different from the ways in which it is represented in these arguments, they are of little help in understanding the injustices associated with it. Thus, although the freedom of movement and the freedom of association arguments develop accounts of ideally just immigration arrangements, they tell us little about the nature of existing migration-related injustices, such as the militarization of borders, the rise of privatized immigration detention, or gender-biased admissions policies, aside from, perhaps, that they deviate from the ideal of open borders.

A second criticism maintains that the freedom of movement and freedom of association arguments fail to be action-guiding. An initial concern is that these arguments are unable to guide our responses to real-world migration-related injustices because, as I have just argued, they cannot adequately theorize these injustices. Suppose, however, that we grant that these arguments provide normative standards by which to evaluate real-world migration arrangements, as their proponents assert. In this case, the arguments would be action-guiding in a broad sense: they would require that

actual migration arrangements be made to conform with the standards they recommend. Even here, however, the freedom of movement and freedom of association arguments provide little in the way of specific guidance about how to transition from current migration policies to perfectly just arrangements. For instance, if we were to evaluate current U.S. admissions policies in light of the open borders ideal, we would conclude that the U.S. should lift all immigration restrictions. This may indeed be the case. However, the freedom of movement argument provides little guidance regarding how the U.S. should transition from its current unjust policies to the open borders ideal. Must the U.S. simply throw open its borders? If not, which migrants should receive admissions priority until fully open borders can be established?

Finally, the freedom of movement and freedom of association arguments are counterproductive insofar as they portray migration as a primarily voluntary phenomenon and ignore the many background injustices that shape real-world migration. Because these arguments rely on idealized social ontologies, they also obscure the ways in which power relations, such as gender, race, nationality, and class, mediate real-world migration. But are the freedom of movement and the freedom of association arguments also ideological? I would suggest that they are insofar as they reflect the interests and experiences of academic philosophers who tend to be quite removed from everyday, real-world migration. Moreover, although both arguments defend fairly radical normative prescriptions, they also tend to support the status quo. The freedom of movement argument portrays migration as an isolated phenomenon, rather than as an integral feature of an unjust global order, and the freedom of association argument represents military intervention and aid transfers as simple and effective solutions to distant, local problems, such as poverty and political oppression. In doing so, these arguments sustain the privileged position of affluent countries by ignoring their complicity in creating the political and economic conditions that generate migration. Rather than offer conceptual tools for analyzing how past and present injustices, such as coercive global economic policies, historical colonial relations, or unfair trade policies, ought to bear on our normative judgments about borders and migration, they surreptitiously perpetuate these injustices.

IV. Desiderata for a Non-Ideal Approach to Immigration Justice

These criticisms of the freedom of movement and the freedom of association arguments suggest that nonideal approaches are needed to theorize migration-related injustices and guide our normative

responses to them. Thus, I will now outline several methodological desiderata for an adequate nonideal approach to immigration justice.

First, a nonideal approach to immigration justice should employ a "bottom up" approach to migration justice. As we have seen, ideal arguments aim to develop principles for perfectly just immigration arrangements by applying abstract moral values, such as freedom or equality, to idealized understandings of the migration process. A nonideal approach, by contrast, should take real-world migration, including the background conditions that contribute to it, as its starting point, and aim to identify what justice requires in this context.

Second, it follows that a nonideal approach to immigration justice should include a descriptive model of real-world migration. This model will simplify and abstract away from some aspects of actual migration processes, including only those features that are most important to the particular task at hand. For example, a descriptive model of undocumented immigration to the United States would likely include the demographic composition of the undocumented immigrants living in a particular area, the average length of their residency, prevailing attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, and importantly, their reasons for migrating and the challenges and vulnerabilities they face. A comprehensive descriptive model might also include an historical account of relations between the United States and migrant-sending countries, including the various treaties that established US territorial borders, as well as of the evolution of US immigration policies. It would almost certainly include a description of the transnational economic agreements that have established thick structural linkages between the US and sending countries.

It is not possible to determine in the abstract precisely which features of real-world migration a descriptive model should include. However, it is clear that an adequate model should select these features on the basis of whether they accurately capture what migration is actually like, not what it should be like. This means that it should avoid idealized notions of human capacities, social institutions, and social relations in favor of realistic accounts. This does not, however, mean that descriptive models must altogether avoid theoretical concepts in favor of simple empiricism. Theoretical concepts, such as "pull factor" or "militarization " may be needed to describe migration processes accurately. Social concepts or categories, such as gender and race, will likely also be helpful in determining which empirical facts are relevant. Of course, because concepts and framing

perspectives tend to reflect the perspectives of the theorists who use them, we must be self-conscious about the concepts we employ.

Third, in addition to a descriptive model, a nonideal approach to immigration justice should provide normative resources for evaluating the real-world immigration arrangements that it describes. These resources should enhance our understanding of these arrangements and help us to identify the moral issues that they raise. Normative resources should also enable us to make moral judgments about the given migration arrangements, identifying the ways in which existing policies, practices, and institutions engender or sustain injustice. While it is it is also impossible to determine in the abstract which particular normative resources a given approach should include, it is clear that an adequate approach should include resources that are well suited to the task at hand. Namely, it should draw upon (or develop) moral values and/or principles that will enable us to make principled moral judgments about actual migration arrangements in all their complexity. As I have argued, real-world migration is mediated by a variety of social, structural, and institutional background conditions that may themselves be unjust. Although abstract liberal values may help us to make sense of this moral complexity, other normative resources, such as relational principles of justice and a nuanced account of exploitation, will almost certainly be needed.

Finally, a nonideal approach to immigration justice should be action guiding—that is, it should identify specific ways in which actual migration arrangements could be made more just. Although an adequate nonideal approach need not determine what ideally just migration arrangements would be like, it should offer concrete recommendations for real-world justice improvements.

These methodological desiderata are pluralistic in the sense that they allow for a variety of nonideal approaches to immigration justice. Some excellent work already exists on a number of specific issues, such the treatment of undocumented migrants.[22] However, few nonideal theorists have addressed the prior question of whether liberal states may justifiably restrict immigration in the first place. Although I am unable to do so here, I hope to have taken at least a small step toward achieving this goal in this chapter, while also motivating further pursuits in nonideal theory.[23]

[1] Colin Farrelly, "Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation," *Political Studies* 55 (2007): 844–64; Charles Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology," *Hypatia* 20, no. 3 (2005): 165–84; Laura Valentini, "On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17 (2009): 332–55.

[2] Laura Valentini, "Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map," *Philosophy Compass* 7, no. 9 (2012): 654–64.

[3] Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2005).

[4] For an survey of the field, see McAfee, Noëlle, "Feminist Political Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/feminism-political/>.

[5] Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology"; Onora O'Neill, "Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics," in *Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems*, ed. J.D.G. Evans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 55–69.

[6] Onora O'Neill, "Abstraction, Idealization, and Ideology in Ethics," in *Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems,* ed. J. D. G. Evans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 55–69.

[7] Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology."

[8] Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology"; Amartya Sen, "What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?," *Journal of Philosophy* 103 (2006): 215–38.

[9] Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology," pp. 166-72

[10] Martijin Boot, "The Aim of a Theory of Justice," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 15 (2012): 7–21; John Simmons, "Ideal and Nonideal Theory," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38 (2010): 5–36.

[11] Sen, "What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?"; Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology."

[12] Farrelly, "Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation"; Sen, "What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?"

[13] Mills, "'Ideal Theory' as Ideology," 166–72.

[14] Mills, 166.

[15] Christopher Heath Wellman, "Immigration and Freedom of Association," *Ethics* 119 (2008): 109–41; Phillip Cole and Christopher Heath Wellman, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); David Miller, "Immigration: The Case for Limits," in *Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*, ed. Andrew Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 363–75; David Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

[16] Arash Abizadeh, "Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders," *Political Theory* 36 (2008): 37–65; Joseph Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, Reprint edition (Oxford u.a.: Oxford University Press, 2015); Joseph Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," *Review of Politics* 49 (1987): 251–73; Cole and Wellman, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?*; Philip Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).

[17] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*; Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders."

[18] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 236–52.

[19] Carens, 239.

[20] Cole and Wellman, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?*; Wellman, "Immigration and Freedom of Association."

[21] Although the freedom of movement argument is probably the most important argument in the open borders debate, it is an anomaly in Carens's work: most of his writing on migration explicitly avoids idealizations. In particular, see Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration,* chs. 2-10.

[22] Adam Hosein, "Immigration: The Argument for Legalization," *Social Theory and Practice* 40, no. 4 (2014): 609–30; Amy Sandoval-Reed, "Locating the Injustice of Undocumented Migrant Oppression," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37, no. 4 (2016): 374–98; Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration,* ch. 7.

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